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SÜMMARY. 
A great deal of ecological damage in Third World countries 
is associated with commodity production for the world 
market. Competition in commodity markets prevents 
commodity-exporting countries from making the costs of 
environmental preservation and reconstruction a recurrent 
element in their price. In this paper it will be argued 
that an international commodity agreement (ICA) can be the 
institutional locus where environmental externalities 
associated with commodity production can be integrated in 
a price system. Existing international commodity agree-
ments (ICAs) can be extended to include a price mark-up 
for environmental preservation and reconstruction in com-
modity -produc ing developing countries. This price mark-up 
can be levied in the form of an export tax or in the form 
of a surcharge on import tariffs. This extended function 
of ICAs could give a new impulse to international negotia-
tions on ICAs, especially when this happens in co-opera-
tion with the Common Fund for Commodities. 
1 
Introduction 
There is a growing international awareness that the environmental 
destruction, both in developing and in developed countries, has 
to be stopped. Otherwise, future generations will be charged with 
an immense burden and it is not certain that destruction of the 
natural environment is reversible. Rapid disappearance of tropi-
cal forests, desertification, pollution of subsoil and surface 
waters are all environmental problems which manifest themselves 
on a transnational scale. Long-term effects like a greenhouse 
effect in the atmosphere, perforation of the ozone layer around 
the earth, the acidification of the rain, and dwindling of 
species cannot any more be tackled on a national or regional 
scale. 
The need for action against the global environmental degradation 
is manifestly increasing. Massive international financial efforts 
and investments are required , and probably also changes in con-
sumption patterns to reverse these trends. Few people will deny 
that industrialised countries of the OECD will have to provide 
most of the required finance, for it is their welfare level and 
their historical share in environmental destruction that have 
tipped the ecological balance. 
At present, hardly any institutional channel exists for a global 
allocation of funds for environmental preservation and recon-
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struction. The World Bank and the United Nations Environmental 
Program (UNEP) do finance specific programs and projects, but 
only on an ad hoc basis. Most environmental resources are 
consumed unpriced by the current consumers. Pollutants produced 
as by-products lack a negative price. International trade further 
disturbs the geographical relation between production and 
consumption of pollutants and environmental resources. Unpriced 
environmental inputs are used but not counted in exported final 
goods, while at the same time most pollutants are willy-nilly 
'consumed' domestically. Leontief (1973) designed a theoretical 
framework for the analysis of the implications of these uncounted 
externalities. If the latter were to be included in a price 
system, the real cost prices of all final products would be 
revealed. Such prices would invoke new forms of intersectoral and 
international transfers of funds. Most likely, these real prices 
would cause some kinds of production to be halted or minimized 
because their prices are unacceptable to consumers, companies and 
governments. 
There is no reason to assume that internalization of environmen-
tal externalities cannot work on a global scale. This paper 
attempts to outline the steps necessary for a partial integration 
of environmental production costs in an international context. 
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Third World commodity production and environment 
The Brundtland-report (WCED 1986) recently stressed the connec-
tion between forced development and environmental destruction. 
Enforcement of a rapid industrialization process, enhanced 
production of agriculture and mining, and disappearance of tradi-
tional rural structures often take a heavy toll in terms of envi-
ronmental damage in Third World countries. Much of the damage 
arises from the production of agricultural and mining commodities 
destined for export to OECD countries. 
An example can be found in the impact of international trade in 
tropical timber on tropical rain forests. The need for foreign 
exchange encourages many developing countries to cut timber faster 
than forests can regenerate. This overcutting not only depletes 
future timber sources, but also incurs the loss of other forest-
based livelihoods, and increases in increases soil erosion and 
downstream flooding. Similar negative ecological effects have 
been reported as caused by cattle-ranching and fishing in both 
coastal and deep sea waters. Soil exhaustion, abundant use of 
fertilizers and pesticides in the production of staple crops, 
demolition of vegetation and soil structure caused by open-cast 
mining (e.g. for bauxite), waste disposal by mining activities, 
can in developing countries often be imputed to the production of 
export commodities. 
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Most of the directly harmful effects are feit only by the local 
population in Third World countries. The long-term effects such 
as soil erosion, or exhaustion of soil and water resources, mani-
fest themselves feit through regular 'natural' catastrophes (like 
land slides, floods or drought) or in the form of a slow process 
of rural impoverishment caused by lower agricultural yields. Some 
effects (e.g. pesticide residues) trickle down along the produc-
tion chain. They appear as health hazards for transport and manu-
facturing workers and, ultimately, also for consumers in develo-
ping countries. 
Notwithstanding growing concern about the associated ecological 
damage, most Third World governments hardly have any option but 
to continue the production of export commodities. In 1985, seven-
ty developing countries depended for more than 50 percent of 
their export earnings on export of primary commodities. In forty 
of them (including 23 African countries) commodities even repre-
sented 90 percent or more of their exports. (1) The period of 
low prices since 1980 urged many countries to produce and export 
even more primary commodities in order to finance their import 
needs and growing debt problems. The prescription to increase 
commodity exports often formed part of the IMF readjustment 
package for countries with debt problems, thus forming a factor 
that contributed to further international supply imbalance and 
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depression of export commodity prices. (2). Export diversifi-
cation programs are difficult to realise and can work only in the 
longer term. Many countries tried to shift towards downstream 
activities in the production chain (industrial processing of 
primary products) in order to improve their export earnings. This 
export strategy is, however, hampered by tariff escalation in 
OECD countries. From a purely ecological point of view, indus-
trial processing in many cases only worsens the environmental 
situation. OECD tariffs and international trade structures are so 
organised that Third World countries enjoy the dubious delight of 
a growing comparative advantage in pollution-intensive industries 
like alumina, and pulp and paper. The Brundtland-report explains 
this comparative advantage in the following way: 
" Industrial countries have generally been more successful 
then developing ones in seeing to it that export product 
prices reflect the costs of environmental damage and of con-
trolling that damage. Thus in the case of exports from 
industrial countries, these costs are paid by consumers in 
importing nations, including those in the Third World. But in 
the case of exports from developing countries, such costs 
continue to be borne entirely domestically, largely in the 
form of damage costs to human health, property and ecosys-
tems." (3) 
As a matter of fact, developing countries subsidise industries and 
consumers in OECD countries. Waiter 6e Loudon (1986) calculated that 
OECD members for their 1980 imports from developing countries would 
have incurred direct pollution control costs of $ 5.5 billion if 
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they had been required to meet the environmental standards then 
prevailing in the United States. If the pollution control expen-
ditures associated with the materials that went into the final 
product are also counted, the costs would have mounted to $ 14.2 
billion in 1980. (4). 
Some Third World governments explicitly face the dilemma of the 
need to produce export commodities, while at the same time being 
aware of the need to minimize damage to the environmental resour-
ce base supporting this growth. A solution for this dilemma 
would be to use other, less damaging production techniques, like 
integrated pest management, 'green' fertilizers, and systematic 
reforestation. Sometimes it will be necessary to complement 
commodity production with additional production that neutralizes 
occurring harmful effects, e.g. waste clearance and reforesta-
tion. 
The feasibility of such techniques and the additional production 
costs involved can only be established on a commodity-specifie, 
or even a region-specifie basis. This being done, it is possible 
to establish the additional costs of such alternative techniques 
relative to current techniques. A price premium for commodities 
produced in this way will be required to cover the extra costs. 
The costs of environmental preservation and reconstruction must 
become a recurrent element of the production costs of commodi-
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ties. 
In a situation where many debt-ridden Third World countries compete 
each other with the same commodities and try to increase their 
export volumes, it will be hard to realize the necessary price 
premium. International trading houses, manufacturing firms, and 
other importers in developed countries skillfully play the 
'Divide et Impera'-game, thus contributing to the same effect. 
The free market solution therefore seems to offer meagre pros-
pects. Concerted international action and institutional arrange-
ments will be necessary to realize the internalization of the 
environmental costs in commodity prices. In this context it 
becomes possible to give international commodity agreements a 
new, additional footing. 
Changing climate for international commodity agreements 
The tin crisis marked a crisis of international commodity agree-
ments (ICAs) in more than one sense. In Third World countries and 
in UNCTAD circles ICAs were often considered as a means for the 
attainment of price stabilization and stabilization of export 
earnings of the producing countries. (5 The International Tin 
Agreement for a long time seemed to realize both these ends, and 
therefore was considered by many people as a success story for 
ICAs. 
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To characterise the current discussion on ICAs a brief excursus 
on the tin agreement is useful. The International Tin Agreement 
(ITA) was several times renewed since its birth in 1956. It held 
its position until 1985. Until then it succeeded not only in sta-
bilizing the tin price, but also in maintaining the price level 
on a fairly high level, thus ensuring export earnings, even for 
high-cost tin producers like Bolivia. The market regulation 
effected by the ICA was at times reinforced and at other moments 
thwarted by releases of tin metal f rom US strategie bufferstocks. 
A destabilising factor was the strong production growth of non-
members of the ITA: China and especially Brazil (became the 
world's largest tin producer in 1988). The artificially high tin 
price induced a substitution process in the main tin-consuming 
industries that because of the investments involved will be hard 
to reverse. (6). In 1985 it appeared no longer possible to resist 
market forces. A decreasing tin consumption and excess supply put 
a constant pressure on the free-market tin price. The ITA buffer-
stock manager kept buying tin to support the price. In the last 
months before the tin crisis the bufferstock manager was the only 
buyer at the London Metal Exchange. In November 1985 the member 
countries of the ITA refused to provide further financial means 
for the bufferstock manager. The overhanging bufferstocks at that 
time already amounted half the yearly world tin production. The 
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refusal led to an inimediate breakdown of the price level. Because 
the bufferstock was ntostly financed by bank loans with the stock-
ed tin as security, ITA's bufferstock manager acutely became 
insolvent and the tin crisis was a fact. 
It also was the breakdown of a symbol. The concept of interna-
tional commodity agreements as a means for maintaining prices and 
export eamings on a high level became difficult to defend. This 
happened in a period that developing countries as a group expe-
rienced a fall in real commodity prices of 31 % (1980 - 1987). 
Their shortfall of export eamings over the same period could 
only be restricted to a 12 % level by substantially increasing 
their commodity exports. (7). 
In the (re)negotiation process for new ICAs some major commodity-
importing OECD countries exerted sustained and concerted pressure 
to oriënt the agreements more towards 'free' market forces. In 
this situation price stabilization was left as the only attai-
nable goal of such agreements. The ICAs renegotiated since the 
collapse of ITA have a built-in 'mechanism' for a periodical 
readjustment of reference price levels, in order not to get too 
large deviations from the 'free' price level. In the latest 
cocoa agreement (1986-1989) readjustment of the reference price 
levels is regulated by a semi-automatic mechanism. The latest 
rubber agreement (1987-1992) includes an automatic mechanism 
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which ensures that the reference price closely follows the market 
prices. Current ICAs (8) are mainly aimed at market regulation 
and price stabilization, keeping its reference and intervention 
prices in close conformity with market prices. This leaves the 
pressing problem of commodity-related shortfalls in export ear-
nings unsettled. (9). Other international arrangements like 
IMF's Compensatory Financing Facility and the ones provided 
within the Lomé Convention (Stabex, Compex) may in fact form 
better ways to deal with this problem. 
Disappointment about ICAs failure to meet earlier expectations 
about stabilization of export earnings led to a decreasing appre-
ciation for these arrangements. In a report to the UNCTAD VII 
meeting the UNCTAD Secretariat concluded: 
"In respect of work on individual commodities (..) the results 
have been meagre and, in many cases (excepting renegotiations 
of operative ICAs) inter-governmental efforts have lapsed in 
recent years." (10). 
Another author even declared the ICAs "dead as dinosaurs". (11). 
So far the actual situation around international commodity agree-
ments. 
Environmental issues in ICAs 
International Commodity Agreements are among the very scarce 
international institutions capable of establishing a direct link 
between consumption, trade and production. Therefore, ICAs offer 
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a suitable institutional framework to link environment protection 
and international commodity trade. This can be realised in seve-
ral ways. 
Up to now only one commodity agreement, namely the International 
Tropical Timber Agreement, explicitly includes environmental 
aspects. In the timber agreement member countries are encouraged 
"to support and develop industrial tropical timber reforestation 
and forest management activities". Another of its seven objecti-
ves is "to encourage the development of national policies aimed 
at sustainable utilisation and conservation of tropical forests 
and their genetic sources, and at maintaining the ecological 
balance in the regions concerned". (12). For the realisation of 
these objectives R&D projects in the field of reforestation are 
promoted, while one of its three subcommittees concerns itself 
with reforestation and forest management. The Agreement encoura-
ges member countries only on a voluntary basis to promote envi-
ronmental protection and reforestation. It includes no provisions 
to establish direct links between the costs of forest reconstruc-
tion and timber prices. 
The terms for the integration of environmental protection ele-
ments in ICAs can be extended beyond those included in the timber 
agreement. ICA-negotiations can be used to come to an agreement 
on the price premium necessary to cover the costs of alternative 
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production techniques or environmental reconstruction expenses in 
producing countries. In this way environmental externalities of 
commodity production will be included in an international price 
system. 
When countries assembled in ICA-negotiations agree on this prin-
ciple a number of further steps have to be taken before implemen-
tation can be successful. In next section necessary steps preli-
minary to the integration of environmental externalities in nego-
tiated reference prices will be discerned. 
Towards integration of externalities 
The first implementation phase will comprise rather detailed 
technical and economie studies for each separate commodity. The 
costs of this study phase might be financed by the Comnton Fund 
under the Integrated Programme for Commodities ('Second 
Account'), UNEP, and/or UNIDO. A number of topics for necessary 
partial studies can be identified: 
(a) A global inventarisation of the environmental effects of the 
production of a specific commodity in the main producing 
countries. 
(b) An assessment of available alternative production techniques 
or additional measures to limit the most important negative 
environmental effects. If possible, a time path for implemen-
tation of the available technical alternatives (on purely 
technical criteria) should be worked out. When necessary, 
the technical applicability of these techniques and measures 
in the main producing countries has to be differentiated. 
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(c) A next study subject is the appraisal of the economie effects 
of alternative production techniques and additional measures. 
The effects on the level of production costs and production 
volumes have to be estimated, conditionally differentiated 
for the main producing countries. For the best alternative 
techniques the incremental cost price relative to costs under 
current techniques has to be established, thus indicating 
the magnitude of the gross price markup that will be neces-
sary. For the main producing countries a tentative assessment 
of the effects on import requirements, employment and social 
communities has to be part of this study. 
(d) Another study subject will be the investigation of probable 
substitution effects that may occur in consuming countries 
and industries as a consequences of the gross price markup. 
How will the price elasticity of demand affect the various 
producing countries under different price markup scenarios ? 
(e) Last, but not least in importance, is a study on the form of 
the price markup. In a section below two main variants for 
the introduction of the price markup will be described, viz. 
an export tax versus import duty. Though the import surcharge 
variant seems preferable for some reasons, the ultimate choi-
ce will depend on the practical situation prevailing in a 
specific commodlty market. This study subject also encompas-
ses the outline of proposals for procedures, checks, monito-
ring agencies, and fund management. 
For the second phase political decision-making round the negotia-
ting table will be central. The outcome of the studies has to be 
the basis for the negotiation process. Most probably, the studies 
will contain a number of variants rather than clear-cut, unambi-
guous conclusions on the issues involved. Across various diver-
ging interests - between producing and consuming nations, between 
producing countries with different production conditions, between 
ecological action groups, governments, and established interests 
in commodity chains (like transnational companies) - agreement 
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has to be reached on a number of issues. The most important of 
them are: 
* The acceptable level of ecological damage. For consuming 
nations there will be the trade-off between current cheap 
commodity supply versus tolerating ecological damage in produ-
cing countries that endanger the global ecosystem in the 
future. It is to be expected that on some issues the tolerance 
levels will be lower, namely in cases where immediate health 
damage may be caused in consuming nations, e.g. due to pesti-
cide residues in agricultural commodities. For producing 
nations there is the trade-off between ecological damage and 
the potential loss off export earnings (when consuming coun-
tries are likely to substitute a higher-priced commodity), 
depending among other things on the availability of alternati-
ves for export diversification. 
Probably the best negotiating strategy will be to focus on a 
agreed-upon unacceptable level of ecological damage associa-
ted with the production of the commodity. This being agreed, it 
is possible to assess to which extent this applies to all pro-
ducing countries. 
* A compromise has to be reached on the magnitude of the price 
markup necessary to cover the extra costs of alternative tech-
niques and measures in the production process. Among producing 
nations it will easily be agreed to establish a minimum level, 
i.e. that associated with the extra costs that even the country 
with the most favorable production conditions will have to cope 
with. It may be agreed to defend a higher markup, which implies 
that countries with the most favorable production conditions 
can realise extra gains. However, even with a 'minimum-level' 
strategy tough bargaining with the consuming nations can be 
expected. 
* Finally, governments must achieve an agreement on a number of 
questions relating to the institutional form in which the price 
markup will be introduced (import surcharge, export tax or 
other forms). Associated with this conclusion are decisions on 
a number of questions regarding the setup of a monitoring sys-
tem, check procedures and sanctions to guarantee that the price 
premium will be paid and that the resulting extra earnings will 
be allocated to expenses for environmental reconstruction and 
conservation as agreed upon in the agreement. As part of a 
monitoring system a subcommittee of the ICA may be charged with 
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a permanent review of ecological, technological, and economie 
conditions in the commodity branch. The subcommittee may perio-
dically present proposals on necessary adjustments of the price 
markup. 
The actual extension of current ICAs with provisions to effec-
tuate the incorporation of environmental externalities will be 
the third stage. 
Import lew or export tax 
In principle the environmental price markup can have the form of 
a commodity-specifie import duty charged by the importing coun-
tries or the form of an commodity-specifie export tax levied by 
the exporting countries. Both forms have their own advantages and 
disadvantages. 
One of the implications of the export tax variant is that commo-
dity- importing developing countries will face higher 
import bills. When the international community agrees on the 
principle that most of the financial burden of the environmental 
reconstruction and conservation will have to be borne by the OECD 
countries, additional measures have to be taken. The most direct 
way to elaborate this principle would be the foundation of a com-
pensatory fund financed by OECD countries and managed by the 
Common Fund for Commodities (a 'Third Account' ?) or the World 
Bank. The proportions (13) of the fund and the distribution of 
'drawing rights' are to be settled separately. 
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A second problem associated with the export tax variant is the 
necessity to limit or rule out the possibility of 'free riding', 
i.e. benefiting from the arrangement without sharing the burden 
of it. Therefore, it seems unavoidable to introducé some controls 
that may limit the national sovereignty of producing countries. 
The markup operation can only be a success when the export tax is 
actually levied in all exporting countries and when funds stem-
ming from this surcharge are verifiably used for environmental 
reconstruction or preservation. Any evidence that these condi-
tions are not or only partly fulfilled by one or more producing 
country would undermine the total agreement. Other producing 
countries would fear unfair competition if exporters take the 
levy for their own account as a form of price discount. On the 
other hand, consuming countries in the longer term would no 
longer be prepared to pay a price markup that flows into the 
pockets of private exporters or in general government finance. To 
prevent these things to happen producing countries will have to 
accept some forms of international audit that check the observan-
ce of the rules of the agreement by the producing countries. 
Governments might consider it to interfere with their national 
sovereignty. The auditing body should have the right to inspect: 
(a) exporting companies in order to check whether the price 
markup is actually charged by the exporter and whether the 
funds stemming from the markup actually were transferred 
to the national government. Also the origin of the expor-
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ted commodities has to be verified, in order to prevent 
misuse by re-export or blending of commodities from coun-
tries where no export tax is levied. 
(b) the financial transactions of the national government 
related to a special account to be created for the trans-
fer of funds from the price markup. The international 
auditing committee should be entitled to review both the 
receipts and the expenditures from this account. 
(c) the environmental preservation and reconstruction projects 
financed from these expenditures and shaped by private 
producers, or by local authorities in the commodity-
producing areas. 
In case irregularities are found, the auditing committee reports 
to the standing committee or governing board of the ICA, that may 
urge the country involved to undertake corrective steps. When the 
governing board of the ICA and the national government disagree 
reach agreement a problem arises. Juridical action (e.g. for the 
International Court of Justice in The Hague) seems not the most 
appropriate way to regulate an escalated conflict, as the actual 
economie functioning of the ICA in many cases will be undermined 
before a settlement is reached. 
It has been shown that the environmental price markup in princi-
ple can be charged in the form of an export tax, though implemen-
tation in this way is marred by the necessity of extra measures 
and international bureaucracy. Besides, these measures can easily 
create conflicts with national sovereignty feelings of producing 
countries. Therefore, it is more than worthwhile to consider an 
alternative implementation of the price markup, viz. in the form 
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of an import duty. Many of the problems mentioned before may be 
avoided when the price markup is charged as an import surcharge. 
This commodity-specific import surcharge will have to be paid by 
importers in in the commodity-importing developed countries. They 
pay a fixed amount per quantity imported to the fiscal authori-
ties of their national government. The government of the impor-
ting country periodically transfers this sum to a special 
environment fund administered by the ICA. Governments of produ-
cing countries can make drawings from this fund for projects 
elaborated for environmental preservation and reconstruction to 
neutralize negative ecological side effects associated with the 
production of a commodity. The exporting countries and a statis-
tical body of the ICA knows the commodity quantities exported, so 
the total annual increase of the fund can relatively easy be 
established. Also, it will be relatively easy to establish the 
amount due from every importing country. In other words, the 
import surcharge variant has the advantage that its effectuation 
is relatively easy to check. The 'drawing rights' from the funds 
can be allocated to the producing countries according to their 
exports of the commodity. Additional stimuli and technical assis-
tance may be necessary to avoid that some producing countries do 
not present enough elaborated and feasible projects to be finan-
ced from their quota in the fund. 
19 
A relative disadvantage of the import surcharge variant is that 
the connection between commodity production and implementation of 
environment-preserving techniques becomes less directly. 
Conditions for success 
It has been shown that integration of environmental externalities 
in ICAs is possible, though not easily accomplished. In the model 
described thus far, only current costs for environmental protection 
and reconstruction have been taken into account, while additional 
markups for the depletion of non-renewable resources (e.g. in the 
case of mineral commodities) have been left out of consideration. 
The latter subject has been widely discussed in literature, espe-
cially in reaction to the publications of the Club of Rome. This 
problem was here left out of consideration for purely practical 
reasons. The matter implicates a number of highly disputable 
valuation questions like those regarding time preference, 
historie-geographical distribution of the consumption of deple-
table natural resources and the current value implications of 
future technical innovations in recycling, material-saving and 
the development of non-scarce natural substitutes. In order to 
avoid a paralyzing international dispute on these matters, it 
seems preferable to make a start with the internalisation of 
current environmental externalities associated with commodity 
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production. 
Introduction of a price markup is not necessarily associated with 
price stabilisation. However, the combination of these two issues 
within one international commodity agreement will enlarge the 
chances for success. Without provisions and mechanisms to secure 
price stabilisation the commitment of consuming countries to pay 
the markup would severely be tested in periods of price booms. 
Alternately, the commitment of producing countries to insist on 
payment of the premium would undergo a hard test in periods of 
low prices when competition is harsh. In order to enlarge their 
sales exporters might decide to take the markup for their own 
account as a form of price discount. So, strong price volatility 
would negatively influence the feasibility of an environmental 
price mark-up. Therefore, ICAs with economie mechanisms (buffer-
stock, quotas) for price stabilisation - the so-called formal 
ICAs - seem more success-prone. Formal ICAs exist or existed for 
sugar, tin, coffee, cocoa and rubber. From the point of view of 
consumers the price markup, be it in the form of an export tax or 
import duty, functions as a form of turnover tax on the interna-
tional price of the commodity. 
All formal ICAs depend for their success predominantly on the 
political will of participating governments of producing and 
consuming nations. Apart from that, 'external' factors and actors 
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will have their influence. International commodity agreements be 
successful only if certain conditions apply. The commodity must 
have a certain degree of homogeneity regarding quality and varie-
ty, and is must be possible to stock it in bufferstocks at reaso-
nable costs. Price formation takes place on a market or exchange 
where the price can be influenced by a bufferstock manager. The 
main producing and consuming nations must participate in the ICA, 
so that free market transactions outside the sphere of the ICA 
can be limited in magnitude and number. Stable supply conditions 
must prevail, avoiding discrepancies between (a) the interests of 
traditional producers and newcomers, and (b) diverging production 
costs in the different producing countries. Supply and demand 
side of the commodity market should not be dominated by one or a 
small number of transnational corporations regulating the market 
according to their own interests (e.g. vertical integration), or 
benefiting from the continuation of highly volatile prices (e.g. 
traders and speculators). 
Informal ICAs, like those on jute, wheat, tropical timber and 
olive oil, lack economie mechanisms for price stabilisation. This 
does, however, not necessarily mean that an environmental price 
markup is unfeasible. Participating governments could reach an 
additional agreement on the establishment of a price markup sys-
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tem. This might even be an initiative of importing countries. An 
example of the latter system is currently under discussion for 
the international tropical timber trade. European timber trade 
organizations, feeling a growing public pressure to limit the 
imports of tropical hardwoods that lead to the disappearance of 
tropical rain forests, are lobbying their governments for a sur-
charge on the import prices of tropical hardwood. This surcharge 
(extra import levy) will be used to fund - through the Interna-
tional Tropical Timber Organization - the development of sustai-
nable tropical timber resources. If such a system comes into 
existence exporting countries can make drawings from this fund 
for reforestation projects. 
Conclusion 
Damage to the ecosystem in developing countries is often indispu-
tably related to international trade and especially the interna-
tional trade in commodities. Partly because of their debt problem 
and struggle against poverty, these countries lack the necessary 
financial means for investment in environmental conservation and 
reconstruction. Therefore, there are very good reasons to argue 
in favor of a transfer of funds for ecological conservation and 
reconstruction from OECD countries to Third World countries. 
Present forms of fund transfers for ecological reconstruction 
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(via World Bank, FAO or UNEP projects) occur only on an ad hoc 
basis. Internalisation into a price system is absent. 
International commodity agreements (ICAs), however, are appro-
priate institutional vehicles for the internalisation of such a 
funds transfer by means of a markup in the commodity price. 
Several necessary steps for the realisation of this extra objec-
tive for existing and future ICAs are identified. Whether the 
'environmentalisation' of ICAs will be successful depends prima-
rily on the political will of the participating producer and 
consumer nations. Other factors, associated with the particulari-
ties of a specific commodity market, may also influence the 
degree of success. 
It has been shown that, in principle, an environmental price 
markup can be charged in the fornt of an export tax, though 
additional measures are necessary for the reimbursement of the 
price markup paid by Third World commodity importers, and for 
the creation of an international auditing body. The activities of 
the latter body might interfere with national sovereignty 
feelings in producing countries. Because of the disadvantages of 
the export tax variant, a system in which the price markup is 
levied as an import tax surcharge in commodity-consuming develo-
ped countries seems preferable. 
24 
At present, and particularly since the 'tin crisis' of 1985, 
several ICAs find themselves in an impasse caused by low commodi-
ty prices and a change of attitude towards ICAs in major OECD 
countries. Many developing countries show disappointment about 
the failure of ICAs as instrument for the stabilisation of export 
earnings. The addition of an extra function as described above 
can give a new impulse to current and future ICAs, particularly 
now the operation of the Common Fund for Commodities comes in 
sight. 
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NOTES 
(1) World Bank (1986). 
(2) UNCTAD (1988). 
(3) WCED (1987), p. 83. 
(4) Walter & Loudon (1986). This calculation of the magnitude 
of the hypothetical subsidy might be an underestimation of 
the real costs of ecological damage in exporting countries. 
(WCED 1987, p.84). Besides economie damage costs associated 
with resource depletion are not counted. 
(5) The interpretation of ICAs as a means for export earnings 
stabilization always was criticized by various authors. Many 
governments of various developed countries also opposed this 
interpretation on various occasions. 
(6) The relatively high price of tin caused a decline of the 
consumption of tin for tin-plate and canning, the most 
important applications of tin metal. Tin-plate became more 
and more substituted by aluminium and coated steel. (ITC, 
1986; Economist Intelligence Unit, 1987). 
(7) IMF Commodities Division (1988), p.8 
(8) The coffee agreement (1983-1989) represents a special case 
among the formal commodity agreements. For the regulation of 
the coffee market mainly export quotas are used. There is no 
bufferstock mechanism. At the beginning of each 'coffee 
year' negotiations take place between the participating 
countries to establish the reference prices. 
(9) The cumulative loss of export earnings from non-fuel commo-
dities during the period 1981-1986 has been estimated to 
amount $ 70 billion for developing countries (UNCTAD, 1987). 
(10) UNCTAD (1987), p. 113. 
(11) George (1988), p.61. 
(12) UNCTAD (1983), p. 2. 
(13) The proportions of the fund might be set at a level accor-
ding to the volume of this specific commodity that develo-
ping countries imported in year t-1. Developed countries and 
maybe also the more industrialised NICs contribute to the 
fund according to their import volume in that same year. 
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